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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decisions in In re Mayne1 and 
In re Rodriguez2 may easily escape the notice of lawyers who do not 
take particular interest in lawyer discipline cases or lawyer 
impairment3 issues.  Neither stands out as a case contrary to 
disciplinary case law or unjust in result4—Ms. Mayne and Mr. 
Rodriguez were both disbarred for theft.5  For those who are 
particularly cognizant of the plight of our colleagues who suffer 
from chemical dependency or mental illness, however, the 
decisions are tragic, since they announce the end of the legal 
careers of lawyers who engaged in misconduct while they were 
impaired. 
The fact that neither was entitled to mitigation of their 
disciplinary sanction despite the impairments that led to their 
misconduct raises the question of whether our mitigation 
jurisprudence has led us closer to punishment and farther from 
compassion or hope of rehabilitation.  This comment explores how 
lawyer impairment is addressed in Minnesota’s disciplinary 
process,6 obstacles to achieving just and right decisions in cases 
involving impairment,7 and the compatibility of compassion and 
rehabilitation with the goals of lawyer discipline.8 
II. BACKGROUND: MINNESOTA’S DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM 
A. Determining the Appropriate Disciplinary Sanction 
The purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect the public and 
the administration of justice from lawyers who do not properly 
discharge their professional duties to clients, the legal system, and 
the legal profession.9  Discipline is imposed not to punish the 
 
 1. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2010). 
 2. In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 2010). 
 3. As used in this comment, “impairment” describes a mental impairment, 
which may include or be a result of alcoholism or other addiction.  See ABA 
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 03-429, 1 n.2 (2003). 
 4. In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d at 170 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (stating that 
the decision appears “just” but it is not “right”).  The same might be said of In re 
Mayne.  See In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153; infra Part IV. 
 5. In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d at 170; In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d at 163. 
 6. See infra Parts II and III. 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See infra Part V. 
 9. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 1.1 (1991). 
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lawyer, but to safeguard the administration of justice, protect the 
public, the courts, the profession, and deter future misconduct.10  
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s ultimate focus is on what sanction 
will best serve these interests.11 
Determining the appropriate sanction requires analysis of 
three factors: 1) the nature of the misconduct; 2) the cumulative 
weight of the disciplinary violations; and 3) the harm to the public, 
the legal profession, and the administration of justice.12  The court 
looks at each case on its facts, considers both aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, and looks to similar cases for guidance.13  
 
 10. See In re Stanbury, 561 N.W.2d 507, 512 (Minn. 1997) (“Discipline is 
imposed not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public, to safeguard the 
administration of justice, and to deter potential future misconduct.”); In re 
Hanson, 258 Minn. 231, 233, 103 N.W.2d 863, 864 (1960) (“The purpose of 
disciplining an attorney is not to punish him, but to guard the administration of 
justice and to protect the courts, the legal profession, and the public.”). 
 11. See In re Andrade, 736 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Minn. 2007) (Page, J., dissenting) 
(“[M]y analysis of the case starts not from the presumption of disbarment, but 
with an analysis of what sanction best serves the purposes of attorney discipline.”); 
see also In re Jellinger, 728 N.W.2d 917, 922–23 (Minn. 2007) (“To further [the 
purposes of the disciplinary system], we have imposed conditions on reinstatement 
in many previous cases, and often those conditions have been as rigorous . . . .”); 
In re Rudawski, 710 N.W.2d 264, 271 (Minn. 2006) (“The purpose of disciplinary 
sanctions for professional misconduct is not to punish the attorney, but rather to 
protect the public, to protect the judicial system, and to deter future misconduct 
by the disciplined attorney as well as by other attorneys.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting In re Vaught, 693 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 2005))); In re 
Pierce, 706 N.W.2d 749, 755–56 (Minn. 2005) (“The purposes of disciplinary 
sanctions for professional misconduct are to protect the public, to protect the 
judicial system, and to deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney as well 
as by other attorneys.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re 
Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d 153, 159 (Minn. 2004))); In re Otis, 582 N.W.2d 561, 565 
(Minn. 1998) (holding that disbarment was not necessary to protect the public); 
In re Milloy, 571 N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1997) (stating the court has “not only a 
right to discipline disabled attorneys who engage in misconduct, but a duty to 
impose discipline when it is necessary to protect the public”). 
 12. In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 1988) (citing In re Agnew, 311 
N.W.2d 869, 872 (Minn. 1981)); In re Franke, 345 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Minn. 1984) 
(citing In re Agnew, 311 N.W.2d at 872 (Minn. 1981)).  The ABA model approach 
considers: 1) the duty violated; 2) the lawyer’s mental state; 3) the potential or 
actual injury caused by the misconduct; and 4) the existence of aggravating or 
mitigating factors.  STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 3.0 (1991). 
 13. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 268 (Minn. 2006) (citing In re Wentzell, 
656 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Minn. 2003)); In re Thedens, 557 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Minn. 
1997) (“This court looks to similar cases to assist it in determining proper 
discipline for attorney misconduct.”); In re Wyant, 533 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Minn. 
1995) (“Although this court strives to be consistent with its sanctions, prior 
disciplinary case law is helpful only as analogy; the facts of each case 
independently dictate the appropriate discipline.”). 
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While the court strives for consistency and has occasionally 
indicated it relies on prior decisions to arrive at an appropriate 
sanction and only deviates under unusual or special circumstances,14 
the court’s decisions reflect careful consideration of the factual 
circumstances of each case and recognition that the nature of the 
misconduct will not always dictate a particular sanction.15 
For example, while prior cases as well as the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Standards provide that misappropriation of 
client funds generally warrants disbarment,16 the court nonetheless 
compares the severity of the misconduct to prior cases, the 
cumulative weight of the violations, and the mitigating or 
aggravating factors that may render the usual discipline 
inappropriate.17  Whether a lawyer will be reprimanded, placed on 
probation, suspended, or disbarred is therefore dependent on the 
reasoned judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court, which has 
the final responsibility for determining the appropriate discipline.18 
B. The Nature of the Misconduct 
The nature of the lawyer’s misconduct involves identifying the 
particular violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and with 
reference to prior cases and standards, determining the 
 
 14. See In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d at 325 (“By analogy prior decisions are helpful 
to us in arriving at the appropriate sanction.  However, on occasion, unusual or 
special circumstances may justify some deviation from the holdings of those 
precedents.” (citing In re Gubbins, 380 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Minn. 1986))). 
 15. See In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 269 (citations omitted) (“[A]ttorney 
discipline cases are decided on a case-by-case basis, making the specific factual 
circumstances of each case particularly important.”). 
 16. See In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d 600, 604 (Minn. 2007) (“We have generally said 
that cases involving misappropriation result in disbarment.”); In re Jellinger, 655 
N.W.2d at 316; In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 268 (“Misappropriation of client funds 
constitutes serious misconduct that generally warrants disbarment.”); In re 
Samborski, 644 N.W.2d 402, 407 (Minn. 2002); In re Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d 552, 
555 (Minn. 1994); In re Anderley, 481 N.W.2d 366, 369 (Minn. 1992) (“This court 
usually orders disbarment in cases of extensive misappropriation of client funds.”); 
In re Olsen, 487 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Minn. 1992); STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER 
SANCTIONS 5.11(a) (1991). 
 17. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 269–70. 
 18. In re Edinger, 700 N.W.2d 462, 467 (Minn. 2005).  A petition for public 
discipline is initially brought by the director of the Office of Lawyers Professional 
Responsibility (OLPR), reviewed for probable cause by members of a panel of the 
Board of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, and heard by a referee appointed by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court.  See MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT VOLUME I—STATE, 
RULES ON LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, R. 4, 9, 12, 14 (West 2010). 
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appropriate range of discipline assessing the lawyer’s mental state.19  
The lawyer’s mental state relates directly to the seriousness of the 
misconduct.20  The lawyer’s mental state may have already been 
determined in an underlying criminal or other proceeding, may be 
admitted or stipulated, or may be disputed.21 
A lawyer’s misconduct may be intentional, knowing, or 
negligent.22  Intent, the “most culpable mental state,” means the 
lawyer acted with the “conscious objective or purpose to 
accomplish a particular result”; knowledge means the lawyer acted 
with “conscious awareness of the nature” and circumstance of 
conduct but without the “conscious objective or purpose to 
accomplish the particular result”; and negligence means the lawyer 
failed to be “aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or 
that a result will follow . . . .”23  A lawyer’s mental state can 
significantly impact the sanction imposed, since it may not only 
suggest a particular sanction, but determine the extent to which 
mitigating factors such as lawyer impairment may ameliorate the 
sanction.24 
C. Mitigating Factors 
Mitigating factors are “considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.”25  
They are not defenses or factors that “excuse” or “justify” 
 
 19. Violation of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct constitutes 
misconduct.  MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 8.4(a) (2010).  The violation must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence.  See In re Waite, 782 N.W.2d 820, 823 
(Minn. 2010).  While the Minnesota cases have not explicitly followed the two-step 
approach of the ABA Standards on Imposing Lawyer Discipline by identifying the 
nature of the ethical duty violated and the lawyer’s state of mind, they do so 
implicitly.  See, e.g., In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d at 604–05 (analyzing the nature of the 
misconduct, misappropriation, and the attorney’s depressed state of mind); 
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 3.0 (1991) (outlining factors to be 
considered when imposing a section). 
 20. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 3.0(a) (1991). 
 21. See, e.g., In re Pugh, 710 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. 2006) (admitting 
previous conviction for fraud without the opportunity to relitigate the underlying 
conviction). 
 22. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Theoretical Framework 
(1991). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., In re Madsen, 526 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Minn. 1995) (weighing 
attorney’s intentional fraud in determining his sanction); In re Isaacs, 406 N.W.2d 
526, 529 (Minn. 1987) (analyzing the attorney’s alcoholism as a mitigating factor). 
 25. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.3 (1991). 
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misconduct; they are circumstances considered in determining 
what discipline will best serve the public interest.26  The Minnesota 
decisions have recognized all or substantially all of the mitigating 
factors identified by the ABA,27 which include the following: 
“[A]bsence of prior discipline, absence of dishonest or selfish 
motive, personal or emotional problems, timely effort to make 
restitution, cooperation with disciplinary proceedings, 
inexperience in the practice of law, good reputation, physical or 
mental disability, delay in disciplinary proceedings, imposition of 
other penalties, remorse, and remoteness of prior offenses.”28 
 
 26. See In re Heffernan, 351 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. 1984); In re Hedlund, 293 
N.W.2d 63, 67 (Minn. 1980). 
 27. “Most states have adopted some form of the ABA Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions or have cited them for support.”  ABA/BNA, LAWYER’S MANUAL 
ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT REFERENCE MANUAL 101:3101 (1998) [hereinafter 
ABA/BNA].  The Minnesota Supreme Court has relied on the ABA Standards in 
identifying aggravating and mitigating factors and appropriate discipline.  In re 
Ward, 726 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Minn. 2007) (considering failure to make restitution 
as an aggravating factor); In re Pugh, 710 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Minn. 2006) 
(identifying the appropriate discipline for felony); In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 
270 (Minn. 2006) (consideration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances for 
misconduct); In re Giberson, 581 N.W.2d 351, 355 (Minn. 1998) (identifying 
appropriate discipline for knowingly violating a court order or rule); In re 
Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1994) (identifying appropriate discipline 
for misappropriating funds); In re Swerine, 513 N.W.2d 463, 467 (Minn. 1994) 
(identifying aggravating factors to consider such as victim’s vulnerability and 
attorney’s failure to make restitution); In re Lochow, 469 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Minn. 
1991) (identifying appropriate discipline for misconduct). 
 28. ABA/BNA, supra note 27, at 101:3101; see STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING 
LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32 (1991); see, e.g., In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 271–72 
(recognizing several mitigating factors: lack of prior disciplinary history, 
restitution, remorse, cooperation with director, good character and contributions 
to community, pro-bono work, extraordinary stress, and receipt of counseling for 
personal problems); c.f. In re Aitkin, 787 N.W.2d 152, 162 (Minn. 2010) 
(determining lack of prior disciplinary history is absence of aggravating factor 
rather than mitigating factor); In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 162 (Minn. 2010) 
(considering a number of mitigating factors including psychological disorder); In 
re Albrecht, 779 N.W.2d 530, 538–39 (Minn. 2010) (explaining compliance with 
rules of professional conduct is not a mitigating factor and weighing a number of 
other mitigating factors); In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Minn. 2009) 
(explaining cooperation is not a mitigating factor, but remorse is); In re Q.F.C., 
728 N.W.2d 72, 80–81 (Minn. 2007) (determining procedural error in discipline 
case can prejudice the attorney, making it necessary to dismiss disciplinary 
hearing); In re Moulton, 721 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Minn. 2006) (explaining mere 
compliance with obligation to cooperate not mitigating factor); In re Letourneau, 
712 N.W.2d 183, 189 (Minn. 2006) (deciding prior private probation for failure to 
cooperate with director should be treated as a “neutral factor” and not given 
greater weight in determining attorney discipline); In re Singer, 541 N.W.2d 313, 
316 (Minn. 1996) (excluding past financial misfortune and present lack of 
6
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The court considers mitigating factors regardless of the 
seriousness of the misconduct.29  As a result, the presence of 
numerous mitigating circumstances, none of which would be 
sufficient alone to avoid disbarment, may permit the court to 
determine that disbarment is not necessary to achieve the goals of 
attorney discipline.30  On the other hand, the severity or extent of 
the misconduct and harm may dictate disbarment as the 
appropriate sanction, despite the strength of the mitigating 
factors.31  The court weighs the result of the three factors (nature, 
cumulative weight, and harm flowing from the conduct) and the 
aggravating or mitigating factors and ultimately determines what 
discipline serves the public’s interest.32 
 
business expertise as mitigating functions); In re Jensen, 468 N.W.2d 541, 545 
(Minn. 1991) (recognizing inexperience as a mitigating factor); In re Pokorny, 453 
N.W.2d 345, 348 (Minn. 1990) (weighing cooperation with proceedings and 
attorney’s motive as mitigating factors); In re Klein, 442 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. 
1989) (including lack of selfish or dishonest motive as aggravating factors); In re 
Panel File No. 87-22, 425 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing delay in 
bringing action and prosecuting does not warrant reversal); In re Getty, 401 
N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. 1987) (reducing sanction as a recognition of attorney’s 
inexperience); In re Beal, 374 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Minn. 1985) (recognizing 
cooperation can be mitigating circumstance); In re N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386, 393 
(Minn. 1985) (requiring prejudice to attorney before a dismissal of an action for 
failure to prosecute promptly). 
 29. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 270 (citing In re LaChapelle, 491 N.W.2d 17, 
21 (Minn. 1992)); see STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 4.11 & cmt. 
(1991) (rejecting argument that disbarment results from misappropriation in the 
absence of lack of intent, reasoning that disbarment is the usual discipline for 
misappropriation but does not foreclose consideration of mitigating factors that 
may render the usual discipline inappropriate).  The court has similarly rejected a 
per se disbarment rule for felony convictions.  See In re Olkon, 324 N.W.2d 192, 
195 (Minn. 1982); In re Hedlund, 293 N.W.2d at 67; In re Scallen, 269 N.W.2d 834, 
841–42 (Minn. 1978). 
 30. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 272. 
 31. Id. (explaining that “whether the presence of mitigating circumstances 
will allow an attorney to avoid disbarment for misappropriation depends on the 
severity of the misconduct and the strength of the mitigating factors”). 
 32. See In re Hanvik, 609 N.W.2d 235, 240–41 (Minn. 2000).  Whether the 
presence of mitigating circumstances will allow a lawyer to avoid disbarment for 
misappropriation depends on the severity of the misconduct and the strength of 
the mitigating factors.  The court weighs “the nature of the misconduct, the 
cumulative weight of the disciplinary rule violations, and the potential harm to the 
public, to the legal profession, and to the administration of justice.”  Id. at 240 
(citing In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 1988)). 
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III. LAWYER IMPAIRMENT AND THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS 
A. Lawyers in Crisis 
Chemical dependency and mental health impairments present 
a significant problem for lawyers and the discipline system.  The 
American Bar Association33 estimates that 15% to 20% of U.S. 
lawyers suffer from alcoholism,34 which is nearly twice the 
approximate 9% abuse and dependency rate for adults in the 
United States.35  One estimate suggests that as many as 18% of all 
U.S. lawyers, or nearly one in five, will develop problems related to 
substance abuse at some point in their careers.36 
The statistics regarding mental health issues are even more 
startling.  A 1990 Johns Hopkins study found that of twenty-eight 
professions, lawyers are the most likely to suffer from depression; a 
rate more than three times that of the general population.37  
 
 33. The ABA, through its Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs 
(CoLap), provides resources to “educate the legal profession concerning 
alcoholism, chemical dependencies, stress, depression and other emotional health 
issues and assist and support all bar associations and lawyer assistance programs in 
developing and maintaining methods of providing effective solutions for 
recovery.”  Commission on Lawyer Assistance Programs, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org
/legalservices/colap/ (last updated Nov. 19, 2010). 
 34. Alcoholism is defined as follows: 
[A] primary, chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial, and 
environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations.  
The disease is often progressive and fatal.  It is characterized by 
continuous or periodic impaired control over drinking, preoccupation 
with the drug alcohol, use of alcohol despite adverse consequences, and 
distortions in thinking, most notably denial. 
Robert M. Morse & Daniel K. Flavin, The Definition of Alcoholism, 268 JAMA 1012, 
1014 (1992). 
 35. See Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress: Alcohol-Related Problems and Other 
Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 50–
51 (1995–1996). 
 36. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role of Legal Education in Producing 
Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 225, 
243 (1986); John W. Clark, Jr., We’re from the Bar and We’re Here To Help You, 
GPSOLO MAG., Oct./Nov. 2004, available at http://www.abanet.org/genpractice
/magazine/2004/oct-nov/werefromthebar.html; JOAN BIBELHAUSEN, LAWYERS 
CONCERNED FOR LAWYERS, MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
12 (2009). 
 37. William W. Eaton et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive 
Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1079 (1990).  A study of Washington 
lawyers confirmed a 19% rate of depression as compared to a 3% to 9% rate of 
depression in Western industrialized countries.  G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The 
Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 
13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 240–41 (1990). 
8
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Another study showed that lawyers suffer from generalized anxiety 
disorder at a rate between five to seven times greater than the 
general population and obsessive compulsiveness at ten to thirteen 
times the general population.38 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that alcoholism or alcohol 
abuse has been estimated to be a factor in at least 27% of lawyer 
discipline cases in the United States.39  Precise statistics regarding 
the prevalence of chemical dependency and mental health 
impairments in the discipline system are hard to discern because 
lawyers do not always raise the issue.40  However, chemical 
dependency or mental health was a factor for four of the twenty-
nine, or approximately 14%, of lawyers who were placed on 
probation in Minnesota in 2009.41  This is a reduction from 2008, 
when 28% of the probations involved chemical dependency or 
mental health concerns.42  More than one hundred cases involving 
suspensions or disbarments have involved alcoholism or alcohol 
abuse since 1982, and more than fifty have required lawyers to 
prove psychological fitness to be reinstated.43 
The impact of lawyer impairment was addressed on a national 
level more than three decades ago by the ABA’s promulgation of 
standards aimed at addressing impairment in the disciplinary 
process.44  It has since created the ABA Commission on Lawyer 
Impairment (now known as the Commission on Lawyer Assistance 
Programs or CoLap);45 has adopted mitigation standards for 
 
 38. See Beck et al., supra note 35, at 50–51. 
 39. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., supra note 36, at 243. 
 40. The prevalence of denial in chemically dependent lawyers impacts 
reporting in the disciplinary process.  See Marcia E. Femrite, Addicted Attorneys in 
Disciplinary Proceedings, MICH. B.J. 152, 152 (1991).  Stigma and uncertainty of how 
disciplinary authorities and the profession will treat addiction or mental illness 
almost certainly affects the statistics as well.  See BIBELHAUSEN, supra note 36, at 22. 
 41. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BOARD AND 
THE OFFICE OF LAWYERS PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 13 (2010), available at 
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/AboutUs/Documents/2010%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See BIBELHAUSEN, supra note 36, at 14. 
 44. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Preface (1991) 
(referencing the ABA’s 1979 Standards for Lawyer Discipline and Disciplinary 
Proceedings). 
 45. The ABA created the Commission on Impaired Attorneys in 1988, and its 
name was changed in August 1996 to the Commission on Lawyer Assistance 
Programs to emphasize a broader reach and to avoid any stigma the former name 
might imply.  Myer J. Cohen, The Impaired Lawyer, A.B.A. EXPERIENCE, Winter 2002, 
at 6, 8, available at http://www.nclap.org/article.asp?articleid=93; see Commission on 
Lawyers Assistance Programs, A.B.A., http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/colap/ 
9
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impairment,46 Model Rules of Professional Conduct,47 and opinions 
addressing lawyer impairment;48 and has most recently adopted a 
Model Rule on Conditional Admission to the practice of law.49 
Lawyers in Minnesota were the first in the nation to form a 
lasting organization to assist lawyers with chemical abuse and 
addiction problems.50  Although Minnesota was one of the last 
states to establish a lawyer-funded Lawyer Assistance Program and 
adopt the language of Model Rule 8.3(c),51 its current mitigation 
test for lawyer impairments predates the ABA mitigation standard,52 
as does its conditional admission process.53  Minnesota’s court 
decisions reflect early recognition of alcoholism as a disease54 that 
 
(last updated Aug. 12, 2010). 
 46. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.3 (1991). 
 47. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 5 (2009) (added in 2002 
to suggest a need for a solo practitioner to plan for death or disability); Id. at 
8.3(c) (amended in 1991 to except from Rule 8.3’s disclosure requirements 
information gained by a lawyer or judge in the context of a lawyer assistance 
program); Id. at 1.16(a) (requiring a lawyer to decline or withdraw from 
representation if the lawyer’s mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s 
ability to represent the client). 
 48. See ABA Compendium of Prof’l Responsibility Rules and Standards, 
Formal Op. 03-429 (2003) (discussing firms’ approach to lawyer impairment). 
 49. ABA House of Delegates, Model Rule on Conditional Admission to Practice 
Law (2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/colap/downloads
/model_rule_on_conditional_admission_aug2009.pdf. 
 50. The organization Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers, formed in 1976, has 
been administering Minnesota’s lawyer-funded Lawyer Assistance Program to assist 
lawyers with chemical, mental health, and other concerns since the Minnesota 
Supreme Court approved its creation in 2000.  See TED COLLINS, LAWYERS CONCERNED 
FOR LAWYERS: A 30 YEAR PARTNERSHIP WITH THE BAR (2006), available at 
http://www.mnlcl.org/pdfs/30%20years%20of%20Help%20and%20Hope%20%282
%29.pdf. 
 51. See Order Amending the Rules of the Supreme Court for Registration of 
Attorneys and the Rules of Professional Conduct (C9-81-1206/C1-81-1206; C8-84-1650; 
C4-91-1728) (2000), available at www.mncourts.gov/rules/att_reg_prof_conduct.doc.  
Rule 8.3(c) exempts information received in the context of a lawyer assistance 
program from the mandatory disclosure requirements of Rule 8.3(a).  See MINN. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010). 
 52. See In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn. 1982) (mitigation standard 
for alcoholism adopted upon the recommendation of the director of the OLPR).  
Specific mitigation criteria such as that adopted in In re Johnson were not part of 
the Standards adopted by the ABA in 1986 and appear to have been part of 
amendments made to the Standards in February 1992.  See STANDARDS FOR 
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.3 (1991). 
 53. See Order, In re Rules for Admission to the Bar & In re Rules on 
Professional Responsibility (C5-81-8139; C1-84-2140) (Aug. 10, 2005) (on file with 
author); Judith Rush, Minnesota’s Conditional Admission Rule, WITNESS TO RECOVERY, 
Summer 2005, at 1, 1. 
 54. State v. Fearon, 283 Minn. 90, 97, 166 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Minn. 1969).  
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does not indicate a lack of moral character55 and may be 
considered in imposing lawyer discipline.56 
Abuse or addiction to other chemicals has similarly been 
recognized as a mitigating factor.57  While some court decisions 
reflected skepticism of psychological illness as a mitigating factor,58 
the court nonetheless suspended, rather than disbarred, lawyers to 
allow them to rehabilitate from mental illness even before it 
officially adopted a mitigation standard for psychological illness.59 
 
Fearon represents the court’s first definitive ruling on the issue of whether a 
chronic alcoholic can be said to drink by choice.  The court reversed Fearon’s 
conviction for voluntary public drunkenness, reasoning that Fearon “was no more 
able to make a free choice . . . than a person . . . who was forced to drink under 
the threat of physical violence,” and therefore his drinking was due to his disease 
and therefore involuntary.  See Moeller v. Dep’t of Transp., 281 N.W.2d 879, 882 
(Minn. 1979). 
 55. In re Haukebo, 352 N.W.2d 752, 755–56 (Minn. 1984) (focus is on bar 
applicant’s behavior rather than status as alcoholic). 
 56. See In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Minn. 1983) (mitigation for 
psychological problems); In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 618 (mitigation for 
alcoholism). 
 57. See In re Getty, 518 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. 1994) (noting that cocaine is 
illegal and even if, arguably, the mitigation test applied, “a cocaine dependency 
should not lighten the discipline, or at least should lighten the discipline to a 
lesser extent than alcohol dependency would”); In re Linnerooth, 496 N.W.2d 408, 
408–09 (Minn. 1993) (public reprimand and probation for possession of illegal 
drugs). 
 58. See In re Bialick, 298 Minn. 376, 378–79, 215 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1974) 
(“[A] careful examination of the record does not disclose sufficient evidence to 
sustain respondent’s contention that any or all of these acts were the product of 
his mental illness . . . .”); In re Streater, 262 Minn. 538, 542–43, 115 N.W.2d 729, 
733 (1962) (treating mental illness to be an attempt to garner sympathy for 
unrelated matters). 
 59. See In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d at 279 (adopting mitigation test); In re 
Peters, 332 N.W.2d 10, 17–18 (Minn. 1983) (suspending rather than disbarring 
lawyer to permit him to seek reinstatement after receiving psychological or 
psychiatric treatment and seeking to rehabilitate himself when he abandoned 
practice, failed to pay debt or refund client funds, and neglected clients while he 
was involved in a protracted dissolution proceeding and had sought psychiatric 
treatment); In re O’Hara, 330 N.W.2d 863, 865–73 (Minn. 1983) (holding 
indefinite suspension with opportunity to seek reinstatement within two years 
rather than disbarment where lawyer, because of his chronic alcoholism, 
neglected client matters and made misrepresentations to them, issued fraudulent 
checks, assaulted his wife, made false submissions to the court, and repeatedly 
failed to cooperate with the director); In re Leali, 320 N.W.2d 413, 414 (Minn. 
1982) (holding indefinite suspension when lawyer failed to maintain trust account, 
neglected client matters, borrowed money from a client without adequate security, 
abandoned his clients, and failed to pay child support in light of lawyer’s chemical 
dependency and successful treatment); In re Iverson, 305 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Minn. 
1981) (holding indefinite suspension with reinstatement subject to establishing 
psychiatric and psychological fitness when lawyer’s psychological condition was 
11
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Minnesota’s discipline system does not allow for diversion60 to 
address chemical dependency or mental illness, but it does allow 
disabled lawyers to be placed on inactive status to allow them to get 
the treatment they need to regain their competence as lawyers or 
to adequately defend a disciplinary proceeding.61  In addition, the 
Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (OLPR)62 will place 
lawyers on private probation if their chemical dependency or 
mental health disorders result in misconduct that does not require 
public discipline.63  However, when the impaired lawyer has 
engaged in serious misconduct for which public discipline is 
appropriate or where inactive status is not available, the lawyer’s 
impairment may be raised as a mitigating factor in response to the 
petition of the director of the OLPR to the court for public 
 
such that it would have been difficult for him to carry out his professional duties, 
despite his lack of cooperation in making himself available for an evaluation). 
 60. Diversion programs generally result in removal of a matter from the 
disciplinary system to allow a lawyer to get treatment under appropriate 
supervision and guidelines for a specific period of time.  See also ABA MODEL RULES 
FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 11(G) (2007) (describing Alternatives 
to Discipline Program).  See generally Kristy N. Bernard & Matthew L. Gibson, Note, 
Professional Misconduct by Impaired Attorneys: Is There a Better Way to Treat an Old 
Problem?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619 (2004) (describing how diversion programs 
provide more effective disciplinary methods).   
 61. See MINN. RULES ON LAWYERS PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 28(a) (2010), 
http://lprb.mncourts.gov/rules/RLPR/Rules%20on%20Lawyers%20Professional
%20Responsibility.pdf.  A lawyer whose mental illness or deficiency or habitual use 
of alcohol, narcotics, or other drugs prevents the lawyer from competently 
representing clients must be placed on disability inactive status.  Id.  Disability 
inactive status is also permitted where disability is asserted in a disciplinary 
proceeding and prevents a lawyer from assisting in his or her defense.  Id. at R. 
28(b).  In either case, a lawyer placed on disability inactive status must be 
reinstated to active practice and address his or her misconduct.  Id. at R. 28(d); see 
also Betty M. Shaw, The Rules Regarding Disability Inactive Status, MINN. LAWYER, May 
6, 2002, available at http://www.mncourts.gov/lprb/fc02/fc050602.html 
(explaining that when lawyers are transferred to disability status while serious 
allegations of misconduct are pending against them, the court ordinarily stays the 
disciplinary proceedings during the period of disability.  The court then orders 
that the allegations of misconduct be considered at the reinstatement proceeding 
and that a recommendation for disciplinary sanctions, if any, be made to the court 
at that time). 
 62. The director of the OLPR has the responsibility to investigate, discipline, 
and bring public charges against lawyers.  See MINN. RULES ON LAWYERS PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY R. 8 (2010), available at http://lprb.mncourts.gov/rules/RLPR
/Rules%20on%20Lawyers%20Professional%20Responsibility.pdf. 
 63. But see Betty M. Shaw, Balancing Compassion with the Need for Public 
Protection, MINN. LAWYER, Aug. 28, 1998, available at http://www.mncourts.gov
/lprb/fc98/fc082898.html (noting that private probation is not appropriate when 
the misconduct is very serious or likely to reoccur). 
12
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discipline. 
B. Mitigation for Impaired Lawyers 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has formulated two similar 
standards for mitigation involving impairment, one for alcoholism 
and one for psychological disabilities.  A lawyer seeking to have 
alcoholism considered as a mitigating factor must establish four 
elements: 
1. The accused attorney is affected by alcoholism; 
2. The alcoholism caused the misconduct; 
3. The accused attorney is recovering from alcoholism 
and from any other disorders which caused or 
contributed to the misconduct; and 
4. The recovery has arrested the misconduct and the 
misconduct is not apt to reoccur.64 
Each element must be established by clear and convincing 
evidence.65  Minnesota’s alcoholism mitigation criteria are similar 
to the ABA’s criteria.66  However, while the ABA Standard requires 
 
 64. In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn. 1982). 
 65. Id. at 618–19.  The clear and convincing standard also applies to 
mitigation for psychological illness.  In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 
1983).  This standard is more commonly applied to disciplinary counsel in 
disciplinary proceedings except for petitions for reinstatement, readmission, or 
transfer to and from disability inactive status, when the petitioning lawyer has this 
burden.  See ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 18(D) 
(2007).  The states have adopted various approaches.  See In re Sullivan II, No. 08-
C-12029, 2010 WL 3196271, at *3 (Cal. Bar Ct. Aug. 12, 2010) (offering party bears 
the burden of proving aggravating or mitigating circumstances); In re Zakroff, 934 
A.2d 409, 423 (D.C. 2007) (determining that a lawyer seeking mitigation must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had a disability and that he has 
been substantially rehabilitated, but need only prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the disability substantially affected his misconduct); Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 994 A.2d 928, 930 n.11 (Md. 2010) (lawyer 
asserting a matter in mitigation has burden of proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Albers, 639 S.E.2d 796, 801 (W. Va. 2006) 
(no heightened standard). 
 66. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1992).  See, e.g., 
People v. Katz, 58 P.3d 1176, 1193–94 (Co. 2002) (applying Rule 9.32(i) where 
attorney raised mental disability as a factor in mitigation); In re Thompson, 911 
A.2d 373, 377 (Del. 2006) (upholding ruling that attorney’s depressive disorder 
only given “some weight” under 9.32(i)); In re Christian, 135 P.3d 1062, 1065 
(Kan. 2006) (holding that the attorney was unable to show that his mental 
disability caused misconduct as required by 9.32(i)); In re Bernstein, 966 So. 2d 
537, 544 (La. 2007) (concluding that no “significant causal nexus existed” between 
attorney’s mental disability and conduct under 9.32(i)); In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38, 
44 (Mo. 2008) (finding that attorney’s bipolar disorder satisfied four-prong test of 
13
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medical evidence,67 the Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated 
that, while more than the testimony of the lawyer is required, 
medical evidence should not be the sole evidence to be 
considered.68  As a result, the court has considered the testimony of 
spouses, family members, and other lay witnesses in addition to 
expert testimony and testimony of the respondent.69  The ABA 
Standards also expressly recognizes mitigation for other forms of 
chemical and drug dependency,70 while Minnesota has not.71 
A lawyer who seeks to have a psychological disability 
considered as a mitigating factor must establish the following: 
1. That the attorney has a severe psychological problem; 
2. The psychological problem was the cause of the 
misconduct; 
3. The attorney is undergoing treatment and is making 
progress to recover from the psychological problem that 
caused or contributed to the misconduct; and 
4. The recovery has arrested the misconduct and the 
misconduct is not apt to recur.72 
Minnesota’s imposition of a “severity” requirement is unique.73  The 





9.32(i)); In re Coyner, 149 P.3d 1118, 1123 (Or. 2006) (overturning trial panel’s 
determination finding chemical dependency as a mitigating factor under § 
9.32(i)); Albers, 639 S.E.2d at 801 (adopting STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER 
SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1992)). 
 67. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i)(1) (1992). 
 68. In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 619. 
 69. See In re Isaacs, 406 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Minn. 1987). 
 70. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1992). 
 71. See In re Getty, 518 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Minn. 1994) (suggesting that cocaine 
dependency may not lighten discipline to the same extent as alcohol 
dependency). 
 72. Later decisions have broken the fourth criteria into two separate factors.  
See In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2002) (listing the fourth criterion 
as “recovery has arrested the conduct” and the fifth as “the misconduct is not apt 
to recur” (citing In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1983))). 
 73. The only other jurisdiction that appears to impose a severity requirement 
is North Dakota.  See In re Rau, 533 N.W.2d 691, 695 (N.D. 1995) (noting that the 
lawyer’s lack of remorse and restitution were significant in its decision to disbar 
the lawyer). 
 74. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1992) (mitigating 
factors include when “the respondent is affected by a chemical dependency or 
mental disability”). 
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The logic of the mitigation criteria is evident.  A lawyer who is 
chemically dependent or has a psychological illness that is not 
being effectively treated poses a risk to clients and the public.  
Therefore, when a lawyer who has engaged in misconduct as a 
result of his or her illness can show progress in recovery that has 
arrested the misconduct and has made it unlikely to recur, the risk 
to clients and the public is reduced, allowing a less severe and more 
appropriate sanction to be fashioned that protects the public.  On 
the other hand, when the impairment has no connection to the 
misconduct, the other criteria would appear to have little relevance 
and presumably the illness would be treated in mitigation like 
other personal or emotional problems.75 
5.Psychological Mitigation Applied: In re Mayne 
Mayne was convicted of financial exploitation of a vulnerable 
adult,76 a felony, as a result of her theft of approximately $60,000 
from her ill and elderly father’s funds as his attorney-in-fact.77  
Mayne pleaded guilty and was sentenced to eighteen months in 
custody, stayed during a ten-year probation with conditions that 
included restitution and mental health counseling.78  The director 
brought a petition seeking disbarment, alleging Mayne’s actions 




 75. Mitigation for a “physical or mental disability or impairment” was 
specifically identified in the mitigation Standard approved by the ABA in February 
1986 to distinguish it from other personal and emotional problems because it was 
the mitigating factor treated most inconsistently by the courts.  See STANDARDS FOR 
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.3 (h) cmt. (1986).  The Standard was later amended 
to its present form, which includes “mental disability or chemical dependency 
including alcoholism or drug abuse” and four criteria for its application.  
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1992). 
 76. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 2010).  Mayne’s father was in his 
mid-seventies and was in the early stages of Alzheimer’s at the time of the theft.  Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  Mayne was suspended pending final discipline pursuant to stipulation.  
To access the order see the following link and type “Mayne” in the “Last Name” 
box: http://lprb.mncourts.gov/LawyerSearch/Pages/default.aspx; MINN. RULES 
ON LAWYERS PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 16 (2010).  A lawyer violates MINN. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) by “commit[ing] a criminal act that reflects adversely 
on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;” 
and Rule 8.4(c) by “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.”  See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2005). 
15
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Following a hearing on the issues of mitigation and 
appropriate discipline,80 the referee appointed by the court found 
that Mayne had met some, but not all, of the psychological 
mitigation criteria.81  The referee found that Mayne satisfied two of 
the criteria: One, she suffered from a major depressive, recurrent, 
and obsessive-compulsive disorder, which is a severe psychological 
condition; and two, she was making progress in her treatment.82  
However, the referee determined that Mayne did not meet the 
other three criteria “that her psychological condition caused the 
misconduct, that her treatment had arrested the misconduct, and 
that the misconduct is not likely to recur.”83 
The referee recommended that Mayne be suspended 
indefinitely, for a minimum of five years, with leave to apply for 
reinstatement upon expiration of her criminal probation.84  The 
referee noted what it perceived as the court’s empathy in cases 
involving significant mental health issues and its reading of prior 
case law allowing for mitigation when some but not all of the 
factors had been met,85 as well as other mitigating factors. 
On review,86 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Mayne’s 
misconduct warranted disbarment.87  While the court affirmed the 
referee’s conclusion that Mayne could not satisfy all of the 
psychological mitigation criteria, it disagreed with a number of the 
referee’s findings on the criteria.  The court rejected the referee’s 
determination that Mayne failed to prove causation by showing she 
suffered from the psychological disorders at the time of the 
misconduct because the record as a whole showed that Mayne 
suffered for a lengthy period of time from disorders that “do not 
manifest themselves overnight.”88 
 
 
 80. Mayne admitted the allegations of the petition.  In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 
at 156. 
 81. Id. at 156, 157–58. 
 82. Id. at 157. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 158. 
 85. Id. at 161 (referring to In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Minn. 2007), for 
the proposition that, although the psychological disability in that case did not 
mitigate the intentional conduct, the disability could still be considered in 
mitigating the type of discipline). 
 86. Both the director and Mayne took exception to the referee’s findings and 
recommendations.  Id. at 158. 
 87. Id. at 164. 
 88. Id. at 159. 
16
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The referee’s second basis, that Mayne could not establish 
causation because she had the ability to tell right from wrong, had, 
according to the court, been rejected as mitigation criteria in an 
intervening case.89  The court agreed with the referee’s findings 
that Mayne’s “disorders appear to have caused out-of-control 
hoarding behavior,” the “financial strain of the hoarding may have 
provided Mayne with the motive to take money from her father,” 
and that Mayne’s “chaotic-decision making and deeply clouded 
judgment may have facilitated her misconduct.”90 
However, because these facts showed that Mayne’s illnesses 
were “at most, indirect causes of her misconduct, and indirect 
causation is not enough to justify a finding of causation” this 
criterion has not been met.91  The court distinguished between 
misconduct by omission and affirmative illegal actions: 
If a lawyer’s misconduct consists of failing to do 
something she is supposed to do—i.e., misconduct 
by omission—psychological disorders such as 
Mayne’s might be considered the direct cause of 
such misconduct.  But that is not the case here.  
Mayne’s misconduct involved affirmative illegal 
actions, and she has not proven that her 
psychological disorders directly caused those 
actions.92 
The intentionality of Mayne’s misconduct also dictated that all of 
the mitigating factors must be met for the psychological disorder to 
be considered in mitigation.93 
The Minnesota Supreme Court took the opportunity to clarify 
two additional mitigation criteria.  For recovery to arrest 
misconduct, the lawyer must have stopped his or her current 
propensity to engage in similar misconduct rather than show the 
misconduct was stopped by the treatment itself.94  The court also 
clarified that showing that misconduct is not likely to recur may be 
 
 89. Id. at 159 n.2 (citing In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d 857, 861–62 (Minn. 2009)). 
 90. Id. at 159–60 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 160 (citation omitted). 
 93. Id. at 161 (“[W]e have considered psychological disorders as mitigating 
factors in some cases where the lawyer has failed to prove all of the [mitigation 
criteria] . . . we only do so in the context of unintentional or passive misconduct.” 
(citing In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Minn. 2007))). 
 94. Id. at 160 (“Thus we interpret this requirement to mean that the 
treatment sought by the lawyer must have stopped the lawyer’s current propensity 
to engage in similar misconduct.”). 
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demonstrated by expert opinion.95 
The court considered in mitigation that Mayne’s conduct took 
place outside the practice of law: She was suffering from extreme 
stress as a result of her home being condemned and losing her 
personal property; she was making restitution; she had no prior 
discipline; and she acknowledged her problems and sought 
treatment.96  However, the court held that these mitigating factors 
fell short of what was required to deviate from the sanctions 
generally imposed for similar misconduct and were simply not 
significant enough to outweigh the misconduct.97  In light of the 
serious nature of misconduct, the great harm that resulted, and the 
need to deter future misconduct by lawyers acting as attorneys-in-
fact, the court held that Mayne’s misconduct warranted 
disbarment.98 
6.Mitigation for Alcoholism: In re Rodriguez 
Rodriguez was an attorney with a nonprofit organization that 
provided low cost legal services to low income clients.99  By 
misrepresenting the terms of retainer agreements to eight clients, 
he collected approximately $650 that he misappropriated to his 
own use to buy drugs.100  When he could not be located within the 
state, the court suspended him from the practice of law, giving him 
one year to move to vacate the order of suspension.101  When 
Rodriguez did not move to vacate, the court “deemed the 
allegations of the petition admitted and invited briefs . . . .”102  
Rodriguez submitted a memorandum in which he did not oppose 
the director’s recommendation of disbarment, “accepting with 
gratitude the consequences of [his] addictive behavior” as a 
“devoted member of Alcoholics and Narcotics Anonymous . . . .”103 
 
 95. The referee had taken a “tested-in-real-life” approach and found “[n]o 
one can tell at this time whether misconduct is likely to recur.  The only true test 
would be to give Respondent an opportunity to be tested in real life.”  Id. 
 96. Id. at 161–63. 
 97. Id. at 163. 
 98. Id. at 163–64. 
 99. Jane Friedmann, Lawyer Disbarred for Misuse of Client Funds, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), June 29, 2010, available at www.startribune.com/local/blogs
/97396819.html. 
 100. In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d 170, 170 (Minn. 2010) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 171 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal 
18
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Accordingly, the court ordered disbarment.104  A strong dissent 
accompanied the court’s summary opinion, reasoning that 
disbarment did no more to safeguard the public or deter future 
misconduct than an indefinite suspension would, and that 
suspension, which would allow the possibility of reinstatement, may 
aid in Rodriguez’s recovery from his chemical addiction.105  The 
dissent would have recognized Rodriguez’s remorse and 
commitment to recovery from his addictions in determining the 
sanction.106 
IV. OBSTACLES TO REACHING “JUST” AND “RIGHT” 
DISCIPLINE DECISIONS FOR IMPAIRED LAWYERS 
Both decisions appear to reach a just result based on current 
case law.  Mayne and Rodriguez engaged in serious misconduct 
that undermines the trust and confidence reposed in members of 
the Minnesota bar.107  Their actions harmed the public, the 
profession, and the administration of justice.  Mayne failed to meet 
her burden to show that she was entitled to mitigation for her 
psychological disorder.108  Rodriguez did not even attempt to meet 
the standard.109  But a closer look at the decisions raises troubling 
issues about how the mitigation criteria are interpreted and how 
causation is determined, resulting in confusion, inconsistency, and 
denial of mitigation to lawyers whose misconduct results from their 
impairments. 
A. Severe Psychological Problem 
As indicated above, Minnesota’s requirement of proof of a 
“severe” psychological problem is unique.110  The court’s 
subsequent imposition of a requirement that the psychological 
problem be a “severe psychological disorder on a recognized 
psychological diagnostic scale,”111 either reflects that the term 
 
quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Id. at 170 (majority opinion). 
 105. Id. at 171 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. 170–71; In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. 2010). 
 108. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d at 160. 
 109. See In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d 170, 170 (Minn. 2010). 
 110. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 111. In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Minn. 2009); see In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d 
321, 325 n.2 (Minn. 1988) (outlining the five psychological requirements needed 
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“problem” is too imprecise or that some mistrust of psychological 
illness remains.112  Regardless of its source, the “severity” 
requirement has given rise to confusion,113 narrow distinctions,114 
and a focus toward defining severe psychological disorders in 
theory rather than on whether the lawyer is affected by a mental 
disability.115 
The ABA Standards simply require “medical evidence that the 
respondent is affected by chemical dependency or mental 
disability.”116  This approach to the first criterion has the benefits of 
giving appropriate deference to psychological diagnoses by 
qualified chemical dependency or mental health professionals and 
 
to mitigate misconduct). 
 112. See In re Bialick, 298 Minn. 376, 378–79, 215 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1974); In re 
Streater, 262 Minn. 538, 544, 115 N.W.2d 729, 734 (1962). 
 113. For example, the court’s decision in Farley seems to suggest that 
“impairment of [Pyles’s] cognitive functions, his ability to direct actions, or to 
know right from wrong” is a factor in determining severity; parties believed it 
related to causation.  In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d at 861 (alteration in original) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 114. See In re Albrecht, 779 N.W.2d 530, 535–36 (Minn. 2010) (“moderate” 
adjustment disorder not “severe”); In re Hanvick, 609 N.W.2d 235, 240 (Minn. 
2000) (“serious” depression testified to by expert which fell at “moderate” level of 
depression on diagnostic scale, not “severe”); In re Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d 552, 
554 (Minn. 1994) (“serious disorder” not “severe disorder”). 
 115. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1991).  
“Disability” is not defined by the ABA, and a review of the case law reflects it 
apparently has not been a disputed issue in discipline cases.  To the extent a 
definition is desired, the common definition of a disability is an “inability to 
perform some function.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (9th ed. 2009).  The 
Americans with Disabilities Act focuses on the extent to which a condition 
substantially limits “major life activities.”  See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006 Supp. II 
2007–2009).  In the lawyer discipline context, the focus could be on whether a 
psychological condition has interfered with a lawyer’s ability to practice in an 
ethical manner.  See Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 907 N.E.2d 1172, 1177 (Ohio 
2009) (addressing language of the Ohio’s Rules and Regulations Governing 
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline (Ohio Supreme Court, effective June 1, 2000), which 
focuses on the return of lawyers to “competent, ethical professional practice . . .”). 
 116. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i) (1991).  This 
approach appears to be the most widely applied.  See, e.g., In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38, 
44 (Mo. 2008); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Albers, 639 S.E.2d 796, 801 (W. Va. 
2006) (applying STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32(i)(1) (1991)); see 
also Toledo Bar Ass’n, 907 N.E.2d at 1177 (requiring proof of “a diagnosis of mental 
disability by a qualified health-care professional”); RULES GOVERNING THE MISSOURI 
BAR AND THE JUDICIARY R. 5.285 (2010) (mitigation applied to a “mental disorder”, 
which is a “condition, found in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, that 
more than minimally impairs judgment, cognitive ability, or volitional or 
emotional functioning in relation to performance of professional duties and 
commitments . . .”), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=708.  
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of properly focusing on the lawyer’s condition. 
B. Causation 
At the time the formal mitigation criteria were initially 
adopted, the court made two important observations: mitigation is 
not a defense to misconduct and proving causation is critical.117  
Nonetheless, subsequent cases, including In re Mayne, appear to 
require something almost akin to the M’Naghten criminal liability 
defense118 in psychological disability cases to prove causation.119  
Although the court has recently clarified that “knowing right from 
wrong” is not a test of causation, it is unclear whether “impairment 
of cognitive functions and ability to direct one’s actions”120 remain 
tests for causation or are considered in determining the nature of 
the misconduct. 
The court’s recent clarification of “direct” causation121 provides 
some guidance for defining causation.  However, the context in 
which it appears is troubling122 and underscores the need to 
 
 117. In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616, 618 (Minn. 1982); see In re Samborski, 644 
N.W.2d 402, 408 (Minn. 2002); In re Anderley, 481 N.W.2d 366, 370 (Minn. 1992); 
In re Isaacs, 406 N.W.2d 526, 529 (Minn. 1987). 
 118. See State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 708 n.3 (Minn. 2007) (“[A] 
defendant seeking to establish a mental illness defense must meet the M’Naghten 
standard” by “prov[ing] that at the time he committed the charged offense, he 
‘was laboring under such a defect of reason, from a mental illness or deficiency, as 
not to know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong.’” (quoting Bruestle v. State, 
719 N.W.2d 698, 704 (Minn. 2006))). 
 119. See In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2002) (rejecting a causal 
relationship between depression and active misconduct because Jellinger’s 
conduct demonstrated his depression had not impaired Jellinger’s “ability to 
direct his actions” and “he continued to recognize that his actions were wrong”); 
In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(affirming that the lawyer’s mental illness “did not result in impairment of 
respondent’s cognitive functions, his ability to direct his actions, or to know right 
from wrong”). 
 120. In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d 857, 861–62 (Minn. 2009); see In re Pyles, 421 
N.W.2d at 325. 
 121. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 160 (Minn. 2010); In re Farley, 771 N.W.2d at 
862 (“Indirect causation . . . is not sufficient to justify a finding of causation . . . .”); 
see In re Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1994) (“[R]espondent has not 
proved that his psychological problems . . . caused or significantly contributed to 
his misconduct . . . .”). 
 122. Such a standard would be troubling since, although common features of 
substance addictions and other psychological illnesses can be identified, their 
impact on a particular person is unique.  See, e.g., In re Verra, 932 A.2d 503, 504–05 
(D.C. 2007) (placing lawyer on probation because of causal relationship between 
depression and misappropriation, despite strict approach that misappropriation 
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articulate a standard or definition of causation, because it seems to 
suggest that certain illnesses can be considered the cause of 
misconduct by omission but not intentional misconduct and that 
the illness must be the sole cause of the misconduct.123  Without an 
articulated causation standard, it is left to the director, defense 
counsel, and the referee to attempt to define and determine 
causation in the first instance and for the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to ultimately determine on review whether causation exists.  
At best, this is an inefficient use of resources.124 
The language of the mitigation criteria suggests mitigation 
applies to psychological problems that “caused or contributed” to 
the misconduct.125  Accordingly, the court has found causation 
when the psychological disorder played a “significant role” in 
causing misconduct126 and when misconduct “stems” from 
alcoholism.127  This is consistent with the “substantial factor” test128 
 
results in disbarment); In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38, 44–45 (Mo. 2008) (allowing 
mitigation in the case of a lawyer who misappropriated funds from a trust while he 
suffered from bipolar disorder); In re Crescenzi, 51 A.D.3d 230, 234 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008) (presumption that intentional conversion of client funds makes lawyer 
unfit to practice “can be rebutted by showing that the misappropriation caused by 
drug addiction or mental illness”); Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 907 N.E.2d 1172, 
1178 (Ohio 2009) (allowing mitigation for lawyer who suffered from depression 
and post-traumatic stress disorder who engaged in deception and 
misappropriation); Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Albers, 639 S.E.2d 796, 801 (W. Va. 
2006) (allowing mitigation for criminal convictions when behavior was “affected by 
depressive disorder”). 
 123. See, e.g., In re Shoemaker, 518 N.W.2d at 554 (first alteration in original) 
(finding that Shoemaker’s depression “vaguely contributed to his behavior,” when 
Shoemaker’s expert had testified that his psychological disorder “would have been 
a part of his motivation to [steal],” although it did not “account[] entirely for the 
behavior”). 
 124. For example, a significant portion of the cross-examination in In re Mayne 
was devoted to repeated questioning of Mayne’s expert regarding Mayne’s ability 
to know right from wrong, which, as the expert explained, is a forensic 
determination that is not relevant to diagnosis and treatment of a psychological 
disorder.  See Transcript of Record at 73, 75, 80, 82, 83, In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 
153 (Minn. 2010) (No. A08-1522). 
 125. See In re Weyhrich, 339 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1983) (“[H]e must prove . 
. . that the psychological problem was the cause of the misconduct . . . and [he] is 
making progress to recover from the psychological problem which caused or 
contributed to the misconduct . . . .”). 
 126. In re Bergstrom, 562 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Minn. 1997) (“Bergstrom’s severe 
depression, for which he is being treated, played a significant role in causing his 
misconduct.”). 
 127. In re Fallon, 389 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 1986). 
 128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965) (explaining 
“substantial factor”); see, e.g., Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980); 
Lestico v. Kuehner, 204 Minn. 125, 133, 283 N.W. 122, 127 (1938); Peterson v. 
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followed in tort cases in Minnesota, which recognizes that conduct 
is a “direct cause” if it plays a “substantial part” or is a “substantial 
factor” in bringing about the result.129  “But for” causation is also 
required to meet substantial factor causation, since conduct cannot 
be a substantial factor in bringing about the result if it would have 
occurred even without the conduct.130 
Substantial factor causation is also consistent with the 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which provide the 
following guidance in the commentary to Rule 9.32 of the 
Standards as to how the causation criteria should be applied in the 
mitigation context: 
Issues of physical and mental disability or chemical 
dependency offered as mitigating factors in 
disciplinary proceedings require careful analysis.  
Direct causation between the disability or chemical 
dependency and the offense must be established.  If 
the offense is proven to be attributable solely to a 
disability or chemical dependency, it should be 
given the greatest weight.  If it is principally 
responsible for the offense, it should be given very 
great weight; and if it is a substantial contributing 
cause of the offense, it should be given great weight.  
In all other cases in which the disability or chemical 
dependency is considered as mitigating, it should be 
given little weight.131 
 
Fulton, 192 Minn. 360, 364, 256 N.W. 901, 903 (1934). 
 129. See 4 MICHAEL K. STEENSON & PETER B. KNAPP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: 
JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL § 27.10 (5th ed. 2006 Supp. 2010–2011); see also 
Kronzer v. First Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis, 305 Minn. 415, 426, 235 N.W.2d 187, 
194 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted) (articulating a “direct 
consequences test,” which includes “[c]onsequences which follow in unbroken 
sequence, without an intervening efficient cause”); Mickelson v. Kernkamp, 230 
Minn. 448, 458, 42 N.W.2d 18, 24 (1950) (referring to the “substantial factor 
rule”). 
 130. STEENSON & KNAPP, supra note 129 (quoting George v. Estate of Baker, 
724 N.W.2d 1, 10–11 (Minn. 2006)). 
 131. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.32 cmt. (1991) (emphasis 
added).  Some jurisdictions have modified the second factor to incorporate similar 
standards.  See In re Zakroff, 934 A.2d 409, 423 (D.C. 2007) (quoting In re Verra, 
932 A.2d 503, 504 (D.C. 2007) (stating that the second factor requires showing 
that the lawyer’s disability “substantially affected” the lawyer’s misconduct)); 
Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Baker, 907 N.E.2d 1172, 1177 (Ohio 2009) (applying the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Rules and Regulations Governing 
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline, including the second factor which requires “a 
determination that mental disability contributed to cause the misconduct”).  For 
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The ABA commentary reflects an approach, consistent with 
Minnesota’s definition of causation in the tort context132 that would 
guide the director, defense counsel, and the referees.  Such an 
approach would also promote consistency and ensure that a lawyer 
who engages in misconduct as a result of impairment but 
undergoes appropriate treatment to prevent the misconduct from 
recurring receives the benefit of mitigation. 
As applied to whether a psychological illness caused the 
misconduct at issue, the questions in each case are to what extent the 
lawyer’s impairment played a part in his or her misconduct and the 
likelihood the lawyer’s conduct would have occurred in the 
absence of the illness.133  The focus in this determination would be 
on the opinion of a qualified mental health or chemical 
dependency professional, the testimony of the lawyer, or others.134  
These opinions give some insight into the reputation, practices, 
and ethical behavior of the lawyer who was not impaired, the 
impact the impairment had on the lawyer’s behavior, the 
consistency of that behavior with the particular illness, and other 
relevant considerations. 
If the impairment played no role in the misconduct, and thus 
the misconduct would have happened regardless of the 
impairment, it is not a mitigating factor unless the court wishes to 
consider it mitigating as a personal or emotional problem.135  If a 
 
The Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings 
Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, see Appendix II 
of SUPREME COURT RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAR OF OHIO, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/rules/govbar/govbar.pdf#App2. 
 132. The ABA also supports use of a “but for” approach.  See ABA 
Compendium of Prof’l Responsibility Rules and Standards, Formal Op. 03-429, n.9 
(2003); see also In re Zakroff, 934 A.2d at 423 (stating that “substantially affected” 
test is met by showing that “but for” disabling condition, misconduct would not 
have occurred (quoting In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321, 327 (D.C. 1987))). 
 133. See, e.g., In re Isaacs, 406 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1987). 
 134. See id. at 529 (“Isaacs’ estranged wife testified that his whole life seemed to 
revolve around alcohol, that Isaacs had blackouts from drinking, and that from 
1980 to 1983 he drank himself into oblivion almost every night.  Isaacs’ daughter 
also testified that before he had quit drinking Isaacs was always drunk when out of 
the office and that since he had quit drinking he was more aware of things.  It was 
during this period, 1980 to spring 1984, that all the misconduct other than the 
Rahn incident occurred.  The medical expert also stated that the criteria he used 
for evaluation showed clearly how severely Isaacs’ dependency affected his life.”). 
 135. See In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 272–73 (Minn. 2006) (holding that 
extreme stress as a mitigating factor did not outweigh the seriousness of 
misappropriation); In re Heffernan, 351 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. 1984) (“[T]urmoil 
in respondent’s personal and professional life neither excuses, justifies, nor even 
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causative relationship has been established, the issue is how much 
weight the impairment should be given as a mitigating factor in 
considering what sanction will protect the public and serve the 
purposes of lawyer discipline. 
C. Partial Mitigation 
The decision in In re Mayne exposes a peculiar approach to the 
mitigation criteria, differing standards of mitigation for “passive” 
and “active” misconduct.136  The referee’s recommendation to 
suspend Mayne was based in part on the court’s previous 
consideration of psychological disorders when some, but not all, of 
the factors had been met.137  The court, in rejecting the referee’s 
recommendation, distinguished these cases as mitigation only for 
unintentional or passive misconduct.138  The referee’s confusion is 
understandable.  In re Berg,139 upon which the referee relied, and In 
re Jellinger,140 cited therein, permitted psychological mitigation of 
the discipline in cases involving conduct that would otherwise have 
resulted in disbarment even though not all of the mitigation 
criteria had been met.141 
Berg had misappropriated funds from six different clients, 
actively concealed the misappropriation, forged a client’s signature, 
and made misrepresentations to clients.142  The court indicated that 
Berg’s depression and anxiety could mitigate his unintentional 
misconduct, but not his intentional misconduct.143  Berg also had 
made restitution, had no prior discipline, and had been suffering 
from a terminal heart condition at the time of the misconduct.144  
Although the director acknowledged that Berg only met the first 
factor for psychological mitigation, the court nonetheless accepted 
the stipulated discipline of an indefinite suspension of no less than 
five years, reasoning that it had previously considered depression in 
mitigation when the psychological condition did not completely 
 
explains his misconduct . . . .”). 
 136. See In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2010) (citing In re Berg, 741 
N.W.2d 600, 605 (Minn. 2007)). 
 137. Id. (quoting In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d at 605). 
 138. Id. 
 139. 741 N.W.2d at 605. 
 140. 655 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 2002). 
 141. In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d at 605–06. 
 142. Id. at 602–03. 
 143. Id. at 605. 
 144. Id. 
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satisfy all of the mitigation factors.145  While the court’s opinion 
stated that mitigation was being applied only to the unintentional 
misconduct, since the intentional misappropriation and 
misrepresentations would have justified disbarment,146 the 
mitigation resulted in imposition of a lesser sanction of 
suspension.147 
The basis for the court’s application of mitigation was not 
based on the facts of In re Berg148 but instead appeared to be based 
on the general proposition that depression does not mitigate 
intentional misconduct, for which the court cited In re Jellinger.149  
In In re Jellinger, the court rejected the referee’s determination that 
Jellinger had proved the mitigation factors.150  Jellinger’s expert 
had testified that Jellinger’s misconduct (misrepresentations, lack 
of diligence, communication, cooperation with the disciplinary 
investigation, and misappropriation of approximately $19,000 while 
acting as a personal representative for an estate) “was in large part 
a result of his depressive disorder.”151 
Because the court was not convinced that a causal relationship 
existed between the depression and the affirmative acts of 
misconduct, causation was not met.152  This conclusion, that 
Jellinger’s active misconduct was not caused by his illness, became 
the basis for the distinction in In re Berg between active and passive 
misconduct.153  In addition to failing to meet the causation 
criterion, Jellinger also failed to meet the last two criteria.154  
Nonetheless, Jellinger’s misappropriation and misrepresentation 
did not result in disbarment; he received a “stayed” disbarment 
with conditions, including an indefinite suspension for a minimum 




 145. Id. at 605–06. 
 146. Id. at 604. 
 147. Id. at 606. 
 148. The matter came before the court on the parties’ stipulation, which was 
accompanied by a memorandum describing Berg’s physical and psychological 
condition and other mitigating factors.  Id. at 604. 
 149. Id. at 605 (citing In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d 312, 316 (Minn. 2002)). 
 150. In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d at 315. 
 151. Id. at 314. 
 152. Id. at 315. 
 153. In re Berg, 741 N.W.2d at 605. 
 154. In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d at 315. 
 155. Id. at 316. 
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The principle that has now apparently emerged as black letter 
law in In re Mayne, that all of the psychological factors must be met 
to mitigate intentional misconduct, was applied to prevent any 
mitigation for Mayne, even though it clearly ameliorated the 
disbarment sanction in both In re Berg and In re Jellinger.156  The 
distinction that mitigation ameliorates passive but not active 
misconduct is not borne out by the prior cases. 
The court could conceivably allow a psychological problem to 
be treated as a personal or emotional problem, therefore 
mitigating without a showing of causation157 to ameliorate a 
sanction that appears harsh or unnecessary in light of the 
circumstances of a particular case.  Nonetheless, denying 
mitigation altogether for intentional misconduct is inconsistent 
with the court’s prior decisions, which reject attempts to limit the 
availability of mitigation in misappropriation and criminal cases,158 
and places one more obstacle to mitigation for impairment. 
V. THE BALANCE: DISBARRING IMPAIRED LAWYERS 
A. Protecting the Public by Disbarring Lawyers 
The difficulty with the opinions in In re Mayne and In re 
Rodriguez is not necessarily that the lawyers who took money that 
did not belong to them should not have been disbarred.  Our 
disciplinary jurisprudence certainly supports disbarment of 
attorneys who engage in dishonest conduct prohibited by Rule 
8.4(c), whether it results in a criminal conviction and thereby 
violates Rule 8.4(b) or is prejudicial to the administration of justice 
and thereby violates Rule 8.4(d).  Misappropriation and other 
dishonest conduct threaten public trust and client protection.  The 
court has the difficult job of weighing the factors in light of 
precedent and the unique circumstances of each case in order to 
carry out its duty to protect the public, the profession, and the 
 
 156. In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 163 (Minn. 2010); see cf. In re Berg, 741 
N.W.2d at 604 (“A factor that mitigates Berg’s unintentional misconduct is his 
depression.”); In re Jellinger, 655 N.W.2d at 316 (“We also recognize that Jellinger’s 
depression was shown to have some causative relationship to his passive 
misconduct.”). 
 157. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9.31 (1991). 
 158. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 270–71 (Minn. 2006) (ruling, based on the 
Standards, that mitigation is available in misappropriation cases); In re Olkon, 324 
N.W.2d 192, 195 (Minn. 1982) (refusing to adopt per se disbarment for criminal 
conduct). 
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system of justice.  Ultimately, the court has to determine what 
sanction “best serves the purposes of attorney discipline . . . .”159 
Mitigating factors make all the difference in the sanction a 
lawyer receives for dishonest conduct.  Therefore, while a felony 
conviction generally warrants disbarment, mitigating factors can 
and frequently do warrant a sanction less than disbarment.160  
Similarly, while misappropriation of client funds generally warrants 
disbarment,161 the court has not always disbarred attorneys who 
have misappropriated funds.162  Mitigating factors are considered, 
regardless of the severity of the misconduct, to determine whether 
a less severe sanction is appropriate.163 
Disbarment is an “extreme penalty”164 that “exists primarily as a 
necessary adjunct to criminal prosecution penalties, to protect the 
public and to deter lawyers who may otherwise be tempted to 
perform illegal acts.”165  Disbarment, although not technically 
permanent, usually is.166 
 
 159. In re Andrade, 736 N.W.2d 603, 609 (Minn. 2007) (Page, J., dissenting). 
 160. In re Andrade, 736 N.W.2d at 605.  As the dissent indicates in In re Andrade, 
the court’s prior cases reflect discipline short of disbarment for felony convictions, 
often without mention of mitigating factors.  See id. at 608–09 (Page, J., dissenting) 
(summarizing nine cases involving felony conduct ranging from misappropriation 
charged as a felony theft to securities fraud and three million felony theft 
imposing suspension or lesser discipline); see also In re Olkon, 324 N.W.2d at 196 
(lawyer convicted of two felonies suspended in light of pro bono work, good 
character, as well as contrition, remorse, and counseling for character flaws that 
gave a strong indication that the lawyer would not engage in unethical or illegal 
conduct in the future). 
 161. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 268 (citing In re Olson, 577 N.W.2d 218, 220–
21 (Minn. 1998)). 
 162. Id. (citing In re Hanvik, 609 N.W.2d 235, 242 (Minn. 2000); In re Pyles, 421 
N.W.2d 321, 327 (Minn. 1988)); see In re Isaacs, 451 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Minn. 1990) 
(citing In re Wareham, 413 N.W.2d 820, 821 (Minn. 1987)); In re Simonson, 365 
N.W.2d 259, 261 (Minn. 1985) (holding that misappropriation warrants serious 
sanctions, unless substantial mitigating circumstances exist). 
 163. In re Rooney, 709 N.W.2d at 270–71 (considering lack of disciplinary 
history, restitution, remorse, cooperation with director, good character, significant 
contributions to the community, extraordinary stress, and counseling as factors 
that mitigated lawyer’s misappropriation of $27,700 of client’s funds); see, e.g., In re 
Hanvick, 609 N.W.2d at 241–42 (considering lack of prior disciplinary history and 
restitution); In re Pyles, 421 N.W.2d at 326–27 (considering pro bono service and 
exemplary life); In re Bernstein, 404 N.W.2d 804, 805 (Minn. 1987) (considering 
amount of funds, restitution, contrition, and good character); In re Heffernan, 351 
N.W.2d 13, 14–15 (Minn. 1984) (considering pro bono services, personal turmoil, 
and restitution). 
 164. In re O’Hara, 330 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Minn. 1983). 
 165. In re Olkon, 324 N.W.2d at 195. 
 166. See Betty M. Shaw, Disbarment—Not Necessarily Forever in Minnesota, MINN. 
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Few disbarred attorneys have been reinstated, excluding early 
cases that explicitly contemplated reinstatement after relatively 
brief periods of disbarment.167  Imposing the most serious sanction 
that can be given sends a clear message to the public and other 
lawyers that the conduct is so inconsistent with the standards of the 
profession that the lawyer may no longer be a member.  This 
sanction should not be imposed on lawyers whose misconduct 
arises from their impairments and who are receiving treatment that 
makes future misconduct unlikely. 
B. Rehabilitation, Compassion, and Mitigation 
Compassion and rehabilitation are not foreign to lawyer 
discipline.  An early case denied that “enlistment of a natural 
human sympathy for respondent’s unrelated misfortune” could 
deter the court from its paramount duty to protect the public.168  
However, the court has since recognized that disbarment has 
consequences not only on the lawyer, but on the community,169 and 
has exercised its discretion to make such other dispositions as it 
deems appropriate.170  It has also shown compassion for impaired 
lawyers.171 
 
LAWYER, Aug. 1, 2005 (discussing the disbarment and reinstatement of David 
Anderley and three other Minnesota attorneys). 
 167. Id.; see William J. Wernz, Character, Fitness & Redemption: Measuring Fitness to 
Practice, BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2007, at 18, 19; see Shamed Lawyer Wins Rare Reprieve, 
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Aug. 28, 2006, available at www.dorsey.com
/resources/detail.aspx?pub=2351. 
 168. In re Hanson, 258 Minn. 231, 233, 103 N.W.2d 863, 864 (1960) (denial of 
request by respondent who had quit practicing law three years earlier and who had 
suffered a serious impairment of his eyesight for consideration of hardship). 
 169. See In re Olkon, 324 N.W.2d at 196. 
 170. In re Hansen, 318 N.W.2d 856, 858 (Minn. 1982) (quoting In re Hanson, 
103 N.W.2d at 864).  While acknowledging that “natural human sympathy” cannot 
deter the court from protecting the public, the court nonetheless placed an 
eighty-eight year old lawyer whose improper litigation conduct and failure to 
cooperate were “obviously . . . a result of the lawyer’s advanced age rather than 
moral shortcomings,” on inactive status rather than indefinitely suspending him 
since the discipline was not appropriate or necessary to protect the public.  Id. 
 171. See In re Peters, 332 N.W.2d 10, 18 (Minn. 1983) (suspending rather than 
disbarring lawyer to permit him to seek reinstatement after receiving psychological 
or psychiatric treatment and seek to rehabilitate himself to “once again be 
restored as a worthy and contributing member of the Minnesota bar”); In re 
O’Hara, 330 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Minn. 1983) (suspending rather than disbarring 
lawyer in order to give him an opportunity to rehabilitate himself.  “If his 
alcoholism can be arrested, we are convinced he can be restored as a contributing 
and worthy member of the Minnesota bar.”). 
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Minnesota’s disciplinary history recognizes impairment as a 
mitigating factor that allows rehabilitation: 
Although alcoholism in and of itself is not a defense 
to professional misconduct, it can be a mitigating 
factor in determining the appropriate disciplinary 
sanction.  Here, there are grounds for the 
immediate disbarment of Fallon.  That extreme 
discipline, however, is not imposed.  Fallon’s 
misconduct apparently stems from chronic 
alcoholism and he should be given an opportunity 
to rehabilitate himself.  If Fallon’s illness can be 
arrested, he will likely be, as he once was, a 
contributing and worthy member of the bar.  Until 
he is rehabilitated, however, he is not fit to practice 
law and the public must be protected.172 
Whether or not rehabilitation and empathy are officially 
accepted in our disciplinary jurisprudence, the court has paused 
before imposing the extreme consequence of the disbarment on a 
lawyer who, for one reason or another, should not be ousted from 
the profession.  The reasons have been many, or sometimes not 
even stated, but there are many lawyers who engaged in 
misappropriation or conduct that resulted in felony convictions 
who were not ousted from the profession.173  On the other hand, 
there are plenty of lawyers who engaged in similar conduct and 
have been found undeserving of a less extreme sanction.174  Of 
 
 172. In re Fallon, 389 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 1986). 
 173. See, e.g., In re Lahlum, 719 N.W.2d 707, 707–08 (Minn. 2006) (felony 
theft); In re Post, 686 N.W.2d 529, 529 (Minn. 2004) (felony DWI); In re Singer, 
630 N.W.2d 404, 404 (Minn. 2001) (felony theft for misappropriating funds from 
trust account); In re Barta, 461 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Minn. 1990) (tax fraud and 
evasion); In re Serstock, 432 N.W.2d 179, 179–80 (Minn. 1988) (dismissing traffic 
tickets for favors and failing to file income tax returns); In re Kimmel, 322 N.W.2d 
224, 226–27 (Minn. 1982) (felony criminal sexual conduct); In re Scholle, 274 
N.W.2d 112, 113 (Minn. 1978) (conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine); In re 
Scallen, 269 N.W.2d 834, 835, 837 (Minn. 1978) (securities fraud and felony 
theft); In re Swagler, 239 Minn. 566, 566, 58 N.W.2d 272, 272 (1953) (criminal 
negligence). 
 174. See In re Rothstein, 777 N.W.2d 31, 31 (Minn. 2010) (lawyer 
misappropriating funds from his law firm convicted of felony theft by swindle); In 
re Foster, 771 N.W.2d 512, 512 (Minn. 2009) (felony involving dishonesty); In re 
Andrade, 736 N.W.2d 603, 603–04 (Minn. 2007) (lawyer convicted of attempted 
theft by swindle of money from client); In re Giberson, 735 N.W.2d 683, 683 
(Minn. 2007) (willful failure to pay child support); In re Pugh, 710 N.W.2d 285, 
286–87 (Minn. 2006) (lawyer convicted of thirty-three felony counts, including 
mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering); In re Perez, 688 N.W.2d 562, 565, 
569 (Minn. 2004) (mail fraud); In re Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d 153, 154 (Minn. 
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these, none had engaged in misconduct while they were impaired, 
as Rodriguez and Mayne undoubtedly did; and none of them took 
money to satisfy their addictions or compulsions,175 as Rodriguez 
and Mayne appear to have done.176 
Recognizing that chemical dependency and mental illness 
inordinately affect the legal profession and cause lawyers to engage 
in behaviors that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct is one 
reason to pause.  Recognizing that the public is protected when a 
lawyer seeks appropriate treatment to effectively address the illness 
and prevent future misconduct is another.  Empathy for those who 
suffer from these illnesses and encouragement of rehabilitation are 
merely additional benefits.  Had the court suspended Mayne and 
Rodriguez indefinitely, the sanction would have been a serious one 
that would have protected the public and sent the message to the 
public and the profession that the conduct is not tolerated; it 
would have also sent the message that the legal profession 
encourages rehabilitation.177 
C. The Balance 
The role of the Minnesota Supreme Court is to discipline 
lawyers in the interests of the public and the profession, not to 
show empathy for lawyers who engage in misconduct while they are 
impaired.  However, Minnesota’s discipline jurisprudence 
demonstrates the court’s ability to protect the interests of the 
public and the profession while allowing impaired lawyers to 
rehabilitate themselves.  Mitigation for lawyer impairment serves 
 
2004) (money laundering); In re Klane, 659 N.W.2d 701, 701 (Minn. 2003) (felony 
mail fraud); In re Amundson, 643 N.W.2d 280, 280–81 (Minn. 2002) (five counts 
of felony theft by swindle and misappropriation of client funds). 
 175. See In re Rothstein, 777 N.W.2d at 31; In re Giberson, 735 N.W.2d at 683; In re 
Andrade, 736 N.W.2d at 604; In re Pugh, 710 N.W.2d at 286; In re Perez, 688 N.W.2d 
at 563–64; In re Oberhauser, 679 N.W.2d at 154–55; In re Klane, 659 N.W.2d at 701; 
In re Amundson, 643 N.W.2d at 280. 
 176. See In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 2010); In re Rodriguez, 783 
N.W.2d 170 (Minn. 2010). 
 177. See In re Rodriguez, 783 N.W.2d at 170 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“If we 
disbar Rodriguez, there will be one less reason for him to work toward recovery.  If 
we suspend him indefinitely, he will have an extremely steep hill to climb in order 
to be reinstated, but foreclosing that possibility does not further any of our stated 
goals in lawyer discipline cases.  Here, disbarment does not protect the public 
more than indefinite suspension would; nor does it do more to safeguard the 
administration of justice.  Further, disbarment will not likely deter similar conduct 
by other lawyers.”). 
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these interests.  When viewed from that perspective, the 
disbarments of Mayne and Rodriguez are neither just nor right. 
Establishing and defining a direct causation standard, 
removing other obstacles, and separating concepts of excuse and 
defense from mitigation would result in the mitigation for lawyer 
impairment functioning as it was meant to function.  Nothing in 
the history of either Minnesota’s or the ABA’s adoption of 
mitigating factors suggests that mitigation for psychological or 
other disabilities should be treated with any more suspicion than 
any of the other mitigating factors.  The ABA’s specific 
identification of impairments as mitigating factors and articulation 
of the criteria were intended to promote consistency in recognizing 
that impairments that cause misconduct that are successfully 
treated and give assurances that misconduct will not recur serve to 
protect the public and the profession and should mitigate 
discipline.178 
Our abhorrence of misappropriation or crimes of dishonesty 
by our colleagues, skepticism, or our lack of familiarity with 
psychological disorders should not blind us to the fact that 
psychological impairments may cause lawyers who are otherwise 
honest to behave in ways inconsistent with their character.179  
Recognizing impairment as a mitigating factor does not mean the 
court or the profession condones, accepts, defends, or excuses the 
behavior.  It allows imposition of a sanction that takes into account 
that the impairment has been effectively treated and misconduct is 
not likely to recur.  It also sends the message that the legal 
profession, including its disciplinary system, supports the recovery 
and rehabilitation of impaired lawyers. 
Education is also necessary to dispel misunderstanding and 
misconceptions of impairments to ensure proper respect for the 
role of mental health professionals and the complex nature of 
diagnosis and the variability of psychological illnesses.  For 
example, understanding the following may avoid a misconception 
that a lawyer can or must prove that he or she was under the 
influence of alcohol or in a particular mental state on a particular 
day when he or she engaged in misconduct: 
 
 
 178. See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 1.3, 9.3 cmt. (1991). 
 179. See In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 616, 617 (Minn. 1982) (recognizing the 
“numerous members of the legal profession whose conduct due to alcoholism had 
seriously affected their ability to maintain the standards of the profession . . .”). 
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An impaired lawyer’s mental condition may 
fluctuate over time.  Certain dementias or psychoses 
may impair a lawyer’s performance on “bad days,” 
but not on “good days” during which the lawyer 
behaves normally.  Substance abusers may be able to 
provide competent and diligent representation 
during sober or clean interludes, but may be unable 
to do so during short or extended periods in which 
the abuse occurs.180 
Common understanding of behaviors typically associated with 
alcoholism, such as denial and impaired judgment, have resulted in 
recognition of its impact within the disciplinary system,181 just as 
certain types of misconduct have come to be associated with 
depression.182  The mitigation criteria should be applied in a 
manner that avoids creating obstacles to understanding our 
growing knowledge of impairments that affect lawyers and result in 
discipline. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In re Mayne and In re Rodriguez demonstrate that our mitigation 
standard has become an obstacle to recognizing lawyer impairment 
as a mitigating factor.  These decisions represent the culmination 
of a jurisprudence that has come to treat impairment mitigation as 
an excuse or a defense.  As such, it is subjected to a higher level of 
proof than other mitigating factors.  Its threshold criterion has 
been defined piecemeal in litigation and frequently without regard 
to the science of mental and chemical dependency and the 
testimony of its professionals.  Its undefined and shifting causation 
standard is nearly impossible to meet. 
The decisions also appear to mark a turn from jurisprudence 
that allowed the court to mitigate the sanction of disbarment when 
disbarment was not necessary to protect the public and—when 
appropriate—to ameliorate the impact of the rigid mitigation 
criteria for those lawyers whose impairment leads to active 
misconduct.  Concepts of compassion and rehabilitation are 
 
 180. ABA Compendium of Prof’l Responsibility Rules and Standards, Formal 
Op. 03-429 (2003). 
 181. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 322 N.W.2d at 617. 
 182. See, e.g., In re Mayne, 783 N.W.2d 153, 160 (Minn. 2010).  Although 
mental impairments are most likely to cause violations of Rule 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4, 
they may result in the violation of other rules.  ABA Compendium of Prof’l 
Responsibility Rules and Standards, Formal Op. 03-429 (2003). 
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consistent with protection of the public and the profession and can 
be accomplished by removing the obstacles that have been placed 
in the way of treating impairment as a mitigating factor. 
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